SOME SEW BOOKS.

The Army of Northern Virginia Another important contribution by a Confederate officer to the history of the civil war is made in The Army of Northern Virginia in SEZ, by WILLIAM ALLAN (Houghton, Millin & Co.1. The scope of the author's opportunities of observation are set forth by Mr. John C. lopes in an introduction to this volume. Col. Allan was from the beginning of the war almost constantly at the headquarters of Lieut. Cen. Jackson, and in January, 1863, was apinted Chief of Ordnance of the Second Corps of the Army of Northern Virginia. He look part in the Shenandoah Valler campaign in the spring of 1862, in the engagements preceded the successful movement

against McClellan's communications in the early summer of that year, in the operations of Jackson against Pope in the month of August in the capture of Harper's Ferry, in the battle of Antietam, and in the maintenance of the lines of Fredericksburg. He was qualified to turn his observation to account by a tenacious memory, a sound judgment on military matters, and a strong love of truth. It was his purpose to write the entire history of the Army of Northern Virginia, but he only lived long enough to bring his narrative to the close of the year 1863. It is this installment of his projected history which is presented in

the book before us. We purpose to exemplify the judicial quality of the author's mind and the weight which should attach to his opinions, notwithstanding the bias inevitably resulting from his sympa thies, by marking his comments on McClellan's plans and the results of the Seven Davs' Batties on the Peninsula: his review of the cam paign against Pope, his analysis of the battle of Antietam and its outcome, and finally his discussion of the battle of Fredericksburg.

T. The programme arranged by Gen. McClellan for 1862 is defined by the author in a few sentences. The objective point of the Federal campaign was the capture of Richmond, the capital of the Confederacy and seat of the most important arsenals and manufactories for the supply of the Southern armies. Gen. McClellan deemed an advance directly against the army in front of him unadvisable, because it would yield his opponent all the advantages of defensive positions of his own selection, and would draw the Federal army into the interior of Virginia away from its base and the reach of water transportation and render it dependent upon a single line of railroad for supplies. This was the longest and. as McCiellan thought, the most difficult way of attacking Richmond. He proposed instead a transfer of the Army of the Potomac to the waters of the lower Chesapeake and an advance thence against the Confederate capital. By means of the rivers of that region, all of could be controlled by the Federal navy, he could place his army within a few miles of Richmond and establish a base of supplies near at hand and on deep water. The first suggested was to move his army to Urbana on the Happahannock, and to advance thence by way of West Point to Richmond. In this way he would turn the Confederate position at Manassas completely, and by rapid movements might place his army between the Confederates and their capital. The unexpected withdrawal of the Confederate commander, Joseph E. Johnston, from Manassas to the line of the Rappahannock frustrated this plan and caused its abandonment McClellan's second project was to transfer his army to Fortress Monroe and march thence up the peninsula between the York and the James, while the Federal gunbonts controlled the rivers and protected his flanks. The Federal Cabinet hesitated for a time to approve this scheme. To them it seemed to uncover Washington. The vivid impression made upon the minds of President Lincoln and his advisers by the first battle of Manassas had not been effaced, and they were unwilling to place the great Federal army where it would not be directly in the path of a Confederate force advancing from the interior of Virginia. They yielded at last to McClellan's urgent representations, but in doing so imposed the follow ing conditions: First, that Washington should be garrisoned and covered by sufficient forces to make it perfectly secure; second, that the lower Potomac should be freed from Confederate batteries, and third, that the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad should be reopened and protected. McClellan undertook to comply with these conditions and proceeded to traus fer his army to the lower Chesapeake.

HI. Such was the programme, the attempt to extles that will be found described in detail in some seventy pages of this book. The conduct and the outcome of the campaign in the Peninsula are summed up by Col. Allan on pages 143 150. It is pointed out that the losses of the Confederates in the long, exhausting struggle known as the Seven Days' Battles were by the official reports about 19,700 men. The Federal loss, according to McCiellan's report, was 15,765, of which more than 10,000 were prisoners, wounded and unwounded. Gen. Lee also states that fifty-two pieces of artillery and upward of 35,000 stand of small arms were captured. The stores of every dascription which fell into the bands of the Confeder tos were also great in amount and value. Col. Allan submits, however, that the official statement of the losses of the Federal army conveys but a very inadequate idea of the severity of the defeat it had encountered. As the Federal army had numbered 105,825 on June 20, and had lost, by the official reports only 15,765 in the Seven Days' Battles, it should have contained 90,000 men on July 3. That in fact, however, nearly half of this number were sick or straggling seems evident from a letter written by McClellan to Secretary Stanton on the day named, in which he expresses a doubt whether there were then more than 50,000 men with their colors. This acknowledgment is cited, in conjunction with other Federal tes timony as to the precipitate character of the retreat of McClellan's army from Malvern Hill to Harrison's Bar, to corroborate the assertion of Gen. Lee that "under ordinary circumstances the Federal army should have been destroyed." Col. Allan said that prompt information on the morning of June 28 as to Mc-Clellan's designs would have enabled Lee to concentrate his army one day sooner on the south side of the Chickshominy, and might have rendered the escape of the Federal forces far more difficult. He suggests, too, that on the afternoon of June 30, had Huger and Holmes thrown their divisions against the enemy with half the vigor of Longstreet and A. P. Hill, or had Jackson, with the skill and audacity that characterized his valley campaign, forced Franklin from White Oak Swamp, that day would have been fatal to the arger portion of the Federal army. It is furher noted of Malvern Hill that Gen. Hunter. ho commanded the Federal artillery, which has the principal agent in the repulse of the Confederates, has admitted that "the battle was desperately contested and frequently trembled in the balance. The last attack was nearly successful: but we won, from the fact that we had kept our reserves in hand to meet such an aggressive movement." It is finally e conviction of our author, that, had the Confederates pursued vigorously to Westover, the complete everthrow of the Federal army might

have been their reward.
It is further pronounced undeniable that if such were the unattained possibilities of this campaign on the Confederate side, the very existence of these possibilities was due to the ginia and of its leader. The task they undertook was a bold and difficult one, and they accomplished it in a way deserving of admiration. The Federal army in their front was the largest, best organized, and best appointed force that had ever taken the field on this continent. It outnumbered the Confederates in the proportion of five to four, and its superiorequipment was far greater. It had changed its defensive role of the previous autumn to one of aggression; it had transferred the seat of war from the vicinity of Washing-

ton to that of Richmond. Its advance had been slow but unchecked, and now, with the York and James rivers at command as avenues of supply, and all its preparations complete, it was about to strike the final blow for the capture of the Confederate capi-What was the result? Eighty thousand Confederates attacked this army of 105,000 mon in its chosen position and drove it from Mechanicsville and Cold Harbor, across the Chickshominy, and thence to James River where, half disorganized, it sought safety from destruction under cover of the fleet of gunpoats in the river. Here, powerless for offence. it was left amid the swamps and lowlands under a midsummer's sun to the ravages of diseases more depleting than had been the Confederate arms. The so-called slege of Richmond was ended, and a few weeks McClellan was sent for to defend the fortifications of Washington against the victorious

HII. The events of the campaign which witnessed

the discomfiture of Pope occupy some sixteen

chapters of this narrative. A few pages, however, suffice to sum them up. We are reminded that on Sept. 2. 1882, when Pope's !career as commander of the Army of Virginia came to an end, only about three weeks had elapsed since Lee had left Richmond with Longstreet for the Rapidan. At that time large sections of the State were in possession of the Federals, and armies aggregating over 150,000 men (including the forces under McClellar, under Pope, and under Burnside threatened the Contederate capital. McClellan's army was about to leave Westover to unite with Pope and Burnside on the Rappahannock. Lee determined to strike his weaker adversary. Pope, before this juncture could be effected Moving with celerity he designed to cross the Rapidan on Aug. 18, and strike Pope's army while it lay between that river and the Rappahannock. But tardy transportation and a mistake of his cavalry cost the Confederate leader two days, and deprived him of the best opportunities to effect his purpose. The Federal army, when once behind the Rappahannock, together with the uncertain character of the river itself, baffled Lee for two days more. Increasing, however, the boldness of his strategy as difficulties occurred, and as the union of the two hostile armies into an overwhelming force in his front became more imminent, he adopted a plan of campaign such as, in Col. Allan's opinion, only masters in the art of war may hazard. The result proved the sound-Less of his judgment. He had not been able to prevent the junction of a portion of McCleilan's troops with those of l'ope, but he had defeated the latter General after these reenforcements had joined him, while two-thirds of McClellan's army was either in transita or lying at Alexandria; the one-third of it which had reached Pope was involved In his disaster. Nor had the Confedvictory been a partial one. So far as the army under Pops was concerned the success was far-reaching and complete. In ten days that army had been driven from the Rappahannock to Washington with the loss of half its strength. Its numbers had dwindled from 80,000 to about 40,000 men. It had lost heavily in killed and wounded. Some seven thousand unwounded prisoners had been captured and paroled. Numerous pieces of artillery, many thousand small arms, and a quantity of ammunition had gone to replenish the scanty ordnance of the Confederates. Large amounts of quartermaster. commissary, and other stores had been appropriated by Jackson's troops, but a far larger quantity had been destroyed. For the time Pope's army was incapacitated for offensive operations. That in a week or two a Federal army under McCiellan was again able to take the field was due to the fact that a Federal force greater in number than Lee's whole army had not been involved in Pope's defeat. This force constituted a fresh army. into which were incorporated the remnants of Pope's command. It is pointed out that among the advantages secured by the Confederates as the result of this campaign were the removal of the contending armies from the vicinity of Richmond to that of Washington, the recovery of a large part of northern Virginia with the supplies it contained, and the opportunity of transferring the theatre of war from Confederate to Union territory. It is Col. Allan's opinion that when the great dis parity of force against which Lee had to contend is contrasted with the splendid results of the campaign, there is no room left for criticism of the audacious strategy by which these results were accomplished. The problem presented to the Confederate leader was one of the greatest difficulty. No successful solution was possible that did not involve immense risk. It is pronof daring seldom paralleled that conceived the movement to Pope's rear and confided the most delicate part of its execution to Jackson, who was the Ney of the Confederate

15. Perhaps the most interesting portion of this volume is that which deals with Lee's invasion of Maryland. Twelve chapters are allotted to the topic, and this section of the narrative closes with a review of the campaign and a concise summary of the several movements comprised in the battle of Antietam, or Sharpsburg, the name preferred by Confeder ate historians. As regards the programme of the Confederate commander, we are reminded that the discomilture of the army under Pope and the retreat of all the Federal forces to the lines about Washington had brought to Lee the opportunity, and at the same time had imposed upon him the necessity, of adopting a new plan of operations. It was impossible for him to inflict serious damage upon the enemy by advancing further in the same direction. As he said in a letter written to President Dawis on Sent. 3, 1802, he had no intention of attacking the Union commander in his fortifications, and was not prepared to invest them. Even had he possessed the necessary munitions, he would have been unable to supply provisions for the Accordingly. Lee turned his eyes to the north side of the Potomac. His views, as set forth in the letter just mentioned, were as follows: "The present seems to be the most propitious time since the commencement of the war for the Confederate army to enter Maryland. Two grand armies of the United States which have been operating in Virginia, though now combined, are both weakened and demoralized. Their new levies, of which I understand 60,000 men have already been posted in Washington, are not yet organized, and will take some time to prepare for the field. If it is ever desired to give material aid to Maryland and offer her an opportunity of throwing off the oppression to which she is now subject. this would seem the most favorable time. I have therefore determined." he continued. while threatening the approaches to Washington, to draw the troops into Loudonn, where forage and some provisions can be obtained, menace the possession of the Shenandoah Valley, and, if found practicable, to cross into Maryland. The purpose, if discovered, will have the effect of carrying the enemy north of the Potomac, and, if prevented, will not result in much evil." In another paragraph of the same letter he states the difficulties in his way: "The army is not properly equipped for an invasion of an enemy's territory. It lacks much of the material of war; is feeble in transportation, the animals being much reduced, and the men are poorly provided with clothes, and in thousands of instances are destitute of shoes. Still we cannot afford to be idle, and though weaver skill and courage of the Army of Northern Vir- | than our opponents in men and military equipments, must endeavor to harass if we cannot destroy them. I am aware that the movement is attended with much risk. yet I do not consider success impossible, and shall endeavor to guard it from loss. As long as the army of the enemy are employed on this frontier I have no fears for the safety of lich-mond, yet I earnestly recommend that ad-

vantage be taken of this period of compara-

and water, in the most perfect condition." He

concern is the fear of getting out of ammunition. If the quartermaster's department can furnish any shoes it will be the greatest re-

It was under these circumstances and with these views that Lee headed his columns toward Leesburg as soon as he was convinced of the retreat of Pope to Washington. We cannot follow the author's account of the succeeding operations in detail-it occupies 110 pages of the book-but pass at once to his retrospective comments on the campaign which ended on the field of Antietam or Sharpsburg, and which resulted in the retreat of Lee from Maryland. Col. Allan does not concur in the opinion of Gen. Pentrey that tactically, Antictam was a drawn tattle. He admits that at the centre of the Confederate line the Federals had gained and continued to hold some ground, and that they also retained possession of the Burnside bridge at nightfall. He insists, however, that, with these very slight exceptions, the field on which they had been attacked remained in possession of the Confederates, while two-thirds of the Federal army was so broken and crippled from its unsuccessful assaults as to be virtually bors de combat. Lee had held his ground and felt confident of his ability to continue the contest, for he remained in position the next day. Col. Allan contends, there-fore, that tactically Lee had defeated his antagonist. This, however, he regards as a nar row view of the matter, and he acknowledges that when we take a wider survey the results of Antietam seem indecisive. Considered as an attempt on the part of McClellan to turn to account the stroke of good fortune which had revealed to him Lee's plans, it was a costly and not very creditable failure. Far from crushing Lee in part or altogether, the Foileral army had been so crippled as to be rendered powerless for offence during months to come. On the other hand, it is conceded that the Confederates were so greatly ex hausted by the struggle that Lee was unable to maintain himself on the north side of the Potomac. Turning from the question of tactical of-

ficiency on the field of battle to the antecedent strategy, Col. Allan recognizes that Lee's conduct of the campaign has been sharply criticised. He had crossed the Potomac with a victorious although much worn army. In the face of largely superior forces he had sent half of them to invest Harper's Ferry, and thus took the risk of an attack of the whole l'ederal army upon the other half. The rapid advance of the Federal army had placed him in a criti cal position. With heavy loss he had held the South Mountain passes barely long enough to secure the capture of Harper's Forry, and then had succeeded in concentrating his troops in time to fight McClellan only by exhausting efforts and the utmost energy. Our nuther deems it evident, however, that Lee had not misconceived the task before him. McClellan's operations after the 13th of September, no less than those before it, seem to demonstrate that, but for the chance which revealed Lee's movement to McClelian, the former would have carried out his bold strategy without serious risk or interruption. and would have been ready a few days latthan the 17th, not to receive but to impose battle. Leo's plan of campaign did not contemplate the defence of the South Mountain passes. He did hold them for a day, but that was done to save McLaws and insure the fall of Harper's Ferry. Had Harper's Ferry fallen, as he expected, before McClellan moved for-ward to Turner's Gap, the design of Lee was to retire into the Hagerstown Valley and there concentrate his army. He wished to draw the Federal army as far as possible from Washington, and then he purposed to attack Me-Clellan at the first favorable opportunity The despatch captured by the Federal commander changed the whole character of the campaign. Lee was thrown upon the defensive. but by an unusual display of boldness and skill he snatched the flower safety from the nettledanger. The Federal army was kept back at the South Mountain passes long enough to secure the fall of Harper's Perry, which involved the capture of 11,000 prisoners and nuch material of war, and then the position at Antietam was taken and so held that Lee was able to bring upon the field his whole force in the ultimate struggle with McClellan. Col. Allan conceives that it is difficult for a commander, always contending against odds. more thoroughly to avoid the charge of rashness, and he points out that the great masters of the art of war are those against whom this charge has been most frequently made. Longstreet has said that Leo should have recrossed the Potomac after South Mountain and before the fall of Harper's Ferry, and should not have fought at Antietam. This, in our author's opinion, would have been to o his adversary all the moral results of a victory without a battle. It is nevertheless admitted that, in the light of subsequent events, there is much to be said in favor of the course which Longstreet has since advo-

It is well known that no part of McCiellan's management of this campaign has been more severely consured than his failure to renew the assault upon the Confederates on the 18th of September. It is Col. Allan's conviction that in no case has the Federal commander been more unjustly criticised. We are reminded that McCiellan's decision was approved by his principal subordinates, and that it was entirely in accordance with the feeling of security entertained by Lee, who all day awaited without apprehension a renewal of the attack. In our author's opinion McCleilan's decision was entirely justified by the comparative condition of the two armies. The Federal army had suffered as much in morale as in men on the 17th. Hooker's and Mansfield's corps and Sedgwick's division were not in a condition to attack, as is made plain by Gen. Meade's report on the state of Hooker's corps on the afternoon of the 18th. Burnside was in no better plight. He felt unable even to hold the bridge, which had cost him so heavily. without reenforcements. Only Porter and Franklin were ready for a new combat. No doubt the Confederates also had been sorely weakened, but they were now all in position and they had successfully withstood the as saults of the preceding day. Two Federal corps could not have driven them from the lines which four corps had attacked in vain the day before. Col. Allan, therefore, sees no reason to doubt the correctness of the judg ment formed at the time by Lee on the one hand and McClellan on the other. He believe that an assault on the 18th of September would have resulted disastrously to the Federal

cated.

Was McClellan justified in devoting siweeks after the battle of Anticiam to putting his army in prime condition for another aggressive campaign in Virginia? It has often been asserted that he should have resumed the aggressive more promptly, and such certainly was the opinion of his official superiors at the time. But this, in Col. Allan's judgment, is not conclusive proof that so early a move was wise or even practical. It seems clear that McClelland had not the confidence nor good will of the Washington authorities, and that he suffered delay and embarrassment in obtaining even necessary clothing and shoes as well as the horses required by his army. The author of this book considers it inexplicable that McClellan should have reported on Oct. 21 that he had but 1,000 efficiently mounted cavalry tafter leaving out those needed to picket the river', and that ret up to the end of a month not enough horses had been sent him to replace current losses. Inattention or indifference to his requisition certainly pre vailed to a greater or lesser extent. It is admitted, on the other hand, that this state of things was in no small degree due to McClellan himself. The tone of his correspondence was exasperating. He wore out the patience of his superiors by his complaints, his exaggeration of small difficulties, his disinclination to do the best he could with the means on hand, and his grotesque overestimate of the forces opposed to him. With regard to the tive safety to place its defence, both by land | situation after Antietam. Col. Allan thinks that, in view of the Federal preponderance of goes on to say: "What occasions me most force, a more energetic commander would ing fragments of Northumbrian poetry intelli-

probably have crossed the Potomac some weeks scoper, and advanced against Lee in the Shenandoah Valley. But the author adds that this course would have been exactly in accordance with the expectations and desires

of the Confederate commander.

Col. Allan does not undertake to go fully into the question of McClellan's merits as commander and of the justice of the treatment which he received at the hands of his Government. Some things, however, seem clear; that, for instance, McCiellan's organizing power was great. The army of the Potemas was in an important sense his creation, and its devotion to him was proof of his high capacity for leadership. Neither is it disputed that he was a thoroughly trained soldier; he never handled his men like a tyro or a blockhead On the whole the author of this book acquiesces in the judgment pronounced by Gen. Palfrey that McClellan was the ablest commander that the army of the Potomac ever had. It is not denied, on the other hand, that McClellan's faults were many and glaring. He was slow and cautious to an inordinate degree. He lived under a perpetual hallucina tion as to the strength of his enemy. He based his rlans upon overestimates of his fees that no other sensible man with reasonable means of information would have ac cepted. He was always seeing difficulties in his way, and he dwelt far more on these than on the advantages which might flow from a vigorous and skilful employment of the im mense resources he had at his disposal. Nevertheless, the author's final word upon this matter is that the course of the Federal Government toward McClellan was unjust. While it is deemed idle to speculate as to the result of the Peninsula campaign had Me-Clellan been heartily supported, it is pronounced certain that his plans had been fearfully disordered by his superiors. After Pope's woful discomfiture, McClellan responded heartily to the call made upon him in the midst of panic and dismay. He restored pub-He confidence, brought order out of chaos, and in two weeks forced the invading army to the south side of the Potomac. That when six weeks later he had brought his forces to a high pitch of efficiency, and had transferred the scene of operations from the Potomac to the Rappahannock, he should have been deposed, is considered by the author of this history unwise and unfair, and not to be accounted for on military reasons alone.

No campaign of the civil war has been more severely criticised than than which culminated in the battle of Fredericksburg. Col. Allan considers the criticism justified. He begins his strictures by observing that Burnside delayed his crossing of the Rappahannock until Lee had collected his whole army in front. He then selected for crossing the place where his fee was best prepared to delay and oppose him. He lost a day in laying his pontoons, He then spent another day in deciding upon a plan of action, a matter that ought to have been seitled before he set out. When he had thus given Lee full time to concentrate and place his troops, Burnside made two front atacks at widely separated points. These assaults were not conjoined, and they resulted in the separate defeat of both wings of his army. Franklin's attack was made with too small a force, was not properly supported, and lacked a clearly defined aim. Sumner's assault. though not feeble like Franklin's, was badly managed. It was made by divisions, in sucession, each of which was rent in pieces before the next took its place. It was all directed against a short line of some 500 or 600 yards, which constituted one of the very strongest points in the Confederate position. The Federals came forward by brigades at intervals of several minutes, and were allowed to halt and lire. Every moment they remained at a halt added heavily to their losses, without producing any considerable effect upon the Confederates, and consequently they were swept away in detail by a veteran and well-posted mass of riflemen firing at close quarters. Their only prospect of success lay in a quick and wellsupported dash with the bayonet. It is further noted that no attempt was made to aid the attack by diversions to the right or left of Marye's Hill. Finally, after his first day's failure. Burnside seemed incapable of forming any other plan. He desired to renew the desperate assault of Maryo's Hill, and, when overruled in this, could devise no alternative but to conless defeat by withdrawing 100,000 brave and well-disciplined troops from the presence of 70,000 Confederates. It is acknowledged on the other hand that the Confederate commander has not escaped criticism for his conduct during and after the engagement. Lee's movements, indeed, before the battle, the promptness with which he divined ant and disposad his army to frustrate them, his choice of position, and his manner of arranging his troops to hold it, are pronounced admirable. Neither can our author see that in the conduct of the battle itself more than one serious oversight was committed; this was the failure of A. P. Hill to guard well the gap through which Meade penetrated the Confederate lines. This mistake was gailantly corrected, but it cost many men and might have had serious consequences but for the manner in which Jackson's reserves were massed close at hand. It is Lee's failure, however, to assume the ag-

gressive on the 14th and 15th of December that has been denounced as a grievous fault. It has been asserted by his critics that he lost the opportunity of gaining a great victory by permitting Burnside to recross the river unen barrassed after the first day's fight; that if he had thrown his army upon the Federal force: while they were on the south side of the river. crippled and dispirited, he might have overwhelmed them. By such writers the course pursued by Loo is represented as a failure to appreciate the advantage he had gained, and the splendid possibilities within his reach.
With Col. Allan's refutation of this criticism we must take leave of his book. He conceives it to be probable that Lee did not recognize the extent of the damage he had inflicted upon the repulsed. It should also be borne in mind that

Federal army, so great was the ease and so little the loss with which its attacks had been he could not know the extent of the distrust in Burnside felt by the Federal army. He undoubtedly expected further offensive efforts on his adversary's part. At the same time it is acknowledged by our author that even had Lee known that Burnside would not again attack, he would not have made counter assault upon the Federal army under the fire of the guns on the Stafford Heights. He believed that such an assault would be a very costly one to his army and of very doubtful success. For this reason Col. Allan refuses to admit that one of the boldest soldiers of modern times, whose genius was aggressive and who was ready to take immense risks in attacks, as on the Chickahominy, at Chancellorsville, Gettysburg, and in the Wilderness should be considered overcautious because he hesitated to throw his army into a lowland plain against 100,000 splendidly equipped and veteran soldiers, whose position was at the same time covered by 150 guns that he could neither reach nor neutralize. In word, no evidence yet produced is, in our author's opinion, strong enough to show that lee and Jackson committed mistakes in judg-

Early English Literature.

ment after the battle of Fredericksburg

In The History of Early English Literature, by TOPPORD A. BROOKE (Macmillans), we have an account of English poetry, from its beginnings in Northumbria, about A. D. 670, to the accession of King Alfred, in 871. It is the author's intention to supplement the book before us at some future time by an equally thorough ex position of the prose literature which arose in Wessex. To the execution of the first part of his projected task Mr. Brooke has brought a great deal of special knowledge. remarkable industry, genuine sympathy, and literary skill. In the way of translations and explanatory comment the present volume contains everything needed to render the surviv

gible and attractive to readers unacquainted with the Anglo-Saxon or early English tongue. Of the poems which have come down to us great quantity of passages representing not only what is best, but what is most characteristic, will be found here set forth in metrical form. For this purpose the author has adopted a trochaic movement, each line, however, being divided into two halves by a pause as in the Angio-Saxon original. Alliteration also has been used wherever it is practicable and as much stress as possible is laid on the alliterated words. Theoretically the method seems well fitted to convey the impression of Anglo-Saxon verse, but, of course, the result are not always satisfactory: no metrical translations of poems ever are. For these versions, of which there are many hundreds in this volume, we must refor the reader to the book itself, and we shall confine ourselves to the interesting historical question how i came to pass that Northumbria, which eve since the first invasion of the Danes has been the most backward part of England, was the special home of English poetry? Why did literature in any form first flourish in the north instead of in the south of England, and why did it take the form of poetry instead of prose?

1. The flourishing period of Northumbrian poetry lasted not much more than a century, namely, from about 670 to about 800. All that remains of it is contained in the manuscripts of Beowulf, in two other books, one kept at Exeter and another found at Vercelli, in the Chron icle and in a few other manuscripts. None of the fragments is of any length. A man might read them all through in a few days, but in their narrow space there is an astonishing variety of methods and subjects that proves a keep individuality and an eager life among the poets of the Northumbrian folk. The war song, indeed, was universal among the Teutonic races: the surprising thing is that poetry should in Northumbria, and at so early an epoch, have taken so wide a range. What were the elements which fostered this remarkable growth, and which, so far as we know existed at the period nowhere else than in Northumbria? The reasons for such a flower ing of song ought to be found in the years preceding 670-700. The first and most obvious of these element

is the early greatness of Northumbria and the influence which its tradition of national splen dor exerted on the minds of men. The pride of country has always given an impulse to poetry. The most illustrious poetic times of England are coincident with the sense of na tional unity and greatness which, succeeding an era of splendor, uplifts the people to a high level of feeling and of aspiration. This was the case in the days of Edward III.; it was still more the case in the time of Elizabeth; it has been the case in our own century. such epochs the past sends its impulse into the present and excites it; the present is full of its own engerness and joy, and the futhrill with expectation ture seems to Poetry is then born, or, if not actually born, the nation is then pregnant with Such conditions prevailed in Northumbria in the seventh century. Æthelfrith, who reigned from 593 to 617, raised his country to great honor; and his victory at Chester over the Britons secured the supremacy of the English in the north. He was followed by his brother-in-law, Eadwine, whose supremacy was established far beyond Northumbria. Al most the whole of England owned his sway and every Northumbrian must have felt the pride of country. Then Eadwine set up his cap ital at York, and he thus inherited a share o the greatness at Rome, for York had been th capital of Roman Britains. Added to these things was the strong government which Ead vine founded, and the profound peace which in his days prevailed. When he died in 033 th sense of national splendor, peace, and overlord-ship was keen in the heart of every Northumbrian, and it lasted for more than a century

on to his followers his passionate and poetle temperament. Columba was himself frish poems of his are believed to still exist, and if the song of regret on his exile from Ireland be really his, it is clear that he was a true lyrist. We may be sure that the love of poetry continued to be a tradition in the monastery, and the English who came for education to Iona, and those also who were taught in Northumbria their Christianity by missionaries from that seat of Irish learning, would naturally be irfluenced more or less deeply by the elements of Columba's character. In 617 Oswald, who afterward became King of Northumbria, took refuge with twelve companions at Jona, and during a sojourn of seventoen years became steeped in the spirit which Columba left behind him. He learned Irish, and it is fair to infer that he heard the great Irish poems. When he came trine, the functions of the universal Church. to the throne he summoned missionaries from long, and by them the whole of Northumbria tom of the recent discussion-the respective was brought over to the Christian faith, As Oswald set up Lindisfarne and its subject cation outside of the region of probabilism monasteries on the pattern of Iona, so Oswin. subsequent King of Northumbria, founded Whitby on the same model. Whitby became the great educational centre of the southern part of Northumbria, and from its root sprang a number of related monasteries, all more or less directed by men who had received an Irish training and carried with them some Irish literature. It is said that no fewer than forty-four monasteries were founded by Irishmen in England. From them the northern English derived a learning not to be found elsewhere in Europe at the epoch. Not only religious but classic and literary studies were pursued with eagerness. Historical annals were kept in the monastery and the arts were practised-architecture, graving, chisolling, embroidery, music, and poetry. Irish influence in England may be said to have had a career of about seventy years. During that time the passion, impulsiveness, and tenderness of the Irish character, and some at least, of the Irish poetry, with its elements of color, romance, invention, and charm. penetrated the Northumbrians, and Mr. Brooke is doubtless justified in making this one o the causes which rendered Northumbria more creative of postry than the rest of England. It is certain that Irish influence was at its height in the north during the receptive period of the life of Ceadmon. He was about 50 when he began to make verse, and his first poem is assigned to 670, six years after the Synod of Whitby, when the Irish type o Christianity was superseded by the Roman in the north. It is a matter of controversy whether the other great writer of Angle Savon poetry, Cynewulf, was a Northumbrian, but Mr. Brooke maintains the affirma tive for reasons that seem cogent.

Amid the anarchy by which Northumbria was racked in the eighth century literature gradually decayed. Yet even in its latter days it produced in Alcuin the gfeatest scholar of western Europe whom Charlemagne per suaded in 782 to join his court and take charge of the Palatine schools. He carried with him a number of men who had been educated at York, and with their assistance set up schools in Gaul and Germany. He sent so frequently to York for books and for fresh helpers that he may almost be said to have drained Northumbria of its manuscripts and of its scholars. It is part of the glory of England that it was an English scholar from York who, exactly at the right time, bore off to th Continent the whole of English learning, and out of it built up a new world of knowledge. Had Alcuin remained in England, and had learning been confined to Northumbria, it would in a few years have perished under the devastating flood of the Danes. As it was, instead of a small and dying kingdom in the north of England, the vast Frankish dominion became the home of literature. It was, indeed, the Danes who gave the

death blow to the literature and learning of

the same year the control of the con

Church and State-Why the School Question Was Debated So Vigorousts To THE EDITOR OF THE SUN-Sire In last Sunday's Sun an explanation was offered of how it came about that so many of us American Catholics who expressed ourselves during the recent school controversy happened to be on what the recent Papal document proves to have been the wrong side. Briefly put, the explanation amounted to this: First, those referred to had been brought up in a school of theology, and did not realize either this fact or that there were other schools within the Catholic Church. Secondly, they torgot, or never considered, that it was natural for a school to justify its existence by assuming to itself, unconsciously and without formal untruth, but purely out of love for right doc-

Now was the question which lay at the bot-

rights of the Church and the State in lay edu-

THE PAPAL SCHOOL DOCUMENT.

and within that of doctrinal certainty?" Assuredly no one can be a deep reader of theology without realizing how hard and un-settled many points concerning the rapprochement of Church and State are. There is the fundamental principle that each has its sphere, in which, within its natural bounds, each is supreme; the State has to do with a temporal good, the Church with an eternal But man is the common subject of both; with him, as a member of the body politic, deals the State, and with him, as ordained to eternal life, deals the Church. This fact makes the application of the universally admitted principle that each has rights in this common possession, an extremely difficult matter practically. Of course, the problems in the matter are not near so many or puzzling to-day as they were 600 years ago: experience has been a wonderful enlightener. In fact, historical development rather than doctrinal decision -the actual circumstances of one age as tinctured by a previous one and broadening into a future—has had most to do with bringing us to where we are to-day; just as the facts which are yet to be will have more to do with solving problems which are still enigmas than the theories of existing political or ecclesiastical parties. The Church herself, in the present as in the past, lets rather the exigencies of circumstances suggest solutions of difficulties. and, outside of the great principles which are assured, she lays down no precise, a priori decrees as to details. This is just her course of action in all matters. Decreas are not given out explicitly from the beginning, but promulgated as opportuneness or urgency demands. Such is the meaning of Dr. Newman's Essay upon Development.

These remarks of general bearing enable us o approach the subject we are dealing withthe pince of the State in lay education.

· Was there any ex cathedra utterance which justified the school of theology, which happened to be strong in this country, in claiming that there was but one orthodox view? No, there is not even yet, after Archbishop satolil's exposition, such an utterance; his exposition expresses the Pope's opinion and wishes, and still has none of the marks which a Papail buil in a matter of faith or morals calls for. Indeed, in connection with this, is it especially true that the Church has allowed different exigencies to expose her position—not infallible definitions, but acts of her Pope's, as embodied in official agreements between various powers or in instructions for certain cases, are the surest guide to her mind. However, in interpreting these for general purposes, there is imminent danger that particular circumstances will be overlooked and forgotten. This is just what has happened in the use made of certain instructions of Pope Leo by the opponents of "the Faribault plan." Some not these instructions dealt with countries in which Governments were exterminating the Church by secularizing the schools (secularize in those places is not the innocent word it is with us, it means persecution. In this country, on the contrary, it is a question, to put it broadly, of making it practicable for Catholies to get the benefit of the school system their taxes help to support in system which was never Catholie' and at the same time to be able to manage, without interfering with the constitutional rights of non-Catholies, that their children receive religious instruction.

If there was not an excationary to show that the solution of the problem offered by Archbishop Ireland's opponents, although not within the limits of unquestionally revealed doctrine, was, withal, well within the lines of moral certainty?

Bearing in mind what we have seen as to No, there is not even yet, after Archbishop Satolli's exposition, such an utterance; his